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The Place of Beauty in Contemporary Aesthetics
Wolfgang Huemer and Íngrid Vendrell Ferran 
The notion of beauty has endured a troublesome history over the
last few decades. While for centuries beauty has been considered
one of the central values of art, there have also been times when it
seemed  old-fashioned  to  even  mention  the  term.  The  present
volume aims to explore the nature of beauty and to shed light on its
place in contemporary philosophy and art practice.
The Decline of Beauty
The changing views on beauty become particularly evident when
we consider how the debate has evolved in recent decades. In the
eighteenth and nineteenth century, beauty was widely regarded as
the main value of aesthetics, just as truth was deemed the ultimate
value of the epistemic domain and the good the ultimate value of
the  ethical  sphere.  In  the  early  twentieth  century,leading
philosophers, in both the anglophone traditions and those of so-
called continental philosophy, continued to assign a central role to
beauty.  Regarding  the  former,  recall  that  beauty  is  a  central
concept in Clive Bell’s aesthetics (see Bell 1987, original text from
1914),  but  it  also  plays  an  important  role  in  the  aesthetics
developed  by  authors  belonging  to  the  Graz  School or  the
phenomenological  tradition.  Stephan  Witasek,  for  example,  is
more focused on offering a theory of beauty than a theory of art
(Witasek  1904).  In  the  phenomenological  tradition,  Nicolai
Hartmann and Dietrich von Hildebrand employed the concept of
beauty  in  a  broad  sense  as  synonymous  with  aesthetic  value
(Hartmann  1966:  5–8;  von  Hildebrand  2016:  75,  published  in
German 1977).
In the course of the last century, however, things have changed
dramatically.  The notion of beauty has dwindled in significance
and lost its privileged position not only in aesthetics and art theory,
but also in art practice (for this diagnosis see Scruton 2011: 
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139ff.).  Beauty  has  gradually  become  just  one  aesthetic  value
among  many  others.  This  trend  first  became  perceptible  in  the
practice  of  making  and  responding  to  art.  Think  of  Marcel
Duchamp’s  Fountain,  which he produced in 1914, or his  ready-
mades from the same period. When transforming everyday objects
into artworks by submitting them to an exhibition or displaying
them in a museum, Duchamp clearly did not want to unveil the
hidden  beauty  of  these  objects.  Rather  he  challenged  the  very
conception of art  and the role  of the artist.  Duchamp’s  work is
exemplary of a widespread artistic practice in the twentieth century
that questions the centrality of beauty and with it the very function
of art. In this period, many artists shunned the ornamental function
of art  and suggested that  the main goal  of  an artwork is  not  to
please, but rather to provoke, unsettle or alienate the audience, or
to  prompt  reflection.  As  a  consequence,  even  the  ugly  or  the
disgusting could come to be regarded by artists and art lovers as
equally or even more important  than beauty.  As a result  of  this
practice,  our  perception  of  artworks  and  their  function  also
changed. Art was no longer supposed to evoke the experience of
beauty, but to invite us to reflect upon life, to present reality from
new and unexpected angles, to touch us, and to move us to action.
Parallel to this change of orientation, philosophical aesthetics and
art theory started to eschew beauty in favor of other aspects of the
arts.  Representative  of  this  change is  Arthur  Danto’s  influential
thesis that beauty should not be the end of art (Danto 1981).
The reasons that have brought about these changes in attitude
towards beauty are multifarious and complex. It is likely that we
still  lack the  necessary historical  distance to  analyze  them in a
properly  disinterested  manner.  We can,  however,  pinpoint  some
factors that are related to changes in aesthetics, in philosophy of
art, and in art practice that have occurred during the last century
and that have contributed to this change. In the following, we will
focus on four of them. 
The first is related to the evolution of art theory and aesthetics
in  the  twentieth  century.  Early  aesthetic  theories,  such  as  those
developed by Hutcheson or Kant, offered an analysis of beauty.
Noël Carroll has pointed out that this orientation influenced later
theories and encouraged them to consider these analyses to be of
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pivotal  importance  for  our  understanding  of  the  nature  of  art
(Carroll 2001: 23). In consequence, philosophers who have been
crucial to the development of aesthetics in anglophone countries or
of analytic aesthetics, such as Clive Bell and Monroe C. Beardsley,
treated art “as if it was a subspecies of beauty”, as Carroll puts it
(ibid.).  This claim, we think, can be extended to other aesthetic
traditions,  like that  of  phenomenology,  mentioned above.  At the
beginning  of  the  twentieth  century,  it  was  uncontroversial  and
widespread practice to use the concept of “beauty” as a shortcut
when one wanted to speak of “aesthetic value” in general. Carroll’s
analysis, thus, brings to the fore that there was a common tendency
in  aesthetics  and  art  theory  (at  least  in  Western  philosophy)  to
reduce  “art”  to  “beauty”  and to  reduce  “art  theory”  to  “beauty
theory”. This analysis can also explain the decline of beauty during
the last century, which, we think, can be understood (at least in
part) as a reaction against these forms of reductionism.
This countertendency against reductionism becomes manifest in
several of the central debates that have dominated philosophical
aesthetics over the last century and that continue to do so today.
Take,  for  example,  the  strong  skepticism  towards  classical
aesthetic  notions  such  as  the  notion  of  aesthetic  attitude,  of
disinterested pleasure or of harmony and the development of new
definitions of art as institution or as an open concept.  All these
theoretical moves can be understood (at least in part) as reactions
to the attempt to reduce the values of art to the single value of
beauty and to reduce art theory and aesthetics to the “science of
beauty”. 
With regard to  the debate concerning the notion of aesthetic
attitude,  let  us  recall  the  lively  controversy  between  Jerome
Stolnitz  and  George  Dickie  during  the  1960s.  While  Stolnitz
claimed that  aesthetics  was  a  matter  of  adopting  an  attitude  of
“disinterested and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of
any object of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone” (Stolnitz
1969: 19), Dickie argued that the same idea of aesthetic attitude
was no more than a “myth” which “is no longer useful and in fact
misleads  aesthetic  theory”  (Dickie  1969a:  28).  This  discussion
about  the  meaning and the  function  of  the  notion  of  “aesthetic
attitude” resulted in a generalized skepticism concerning the role
Introduction   4
of contemplation and aesthetic pleasure in the arts (both are key
notions  for  explaining  beauty)  and  contributed  to  a  shift  of
attention from beauty to other aspects of our engagement with art.
The same point can be made in relation to the critique of the
notion of “disinterested pleasure” that emerged at the same time. In
previous  centuries,  it  was  common  to  distinguish  between
contemplation and practice, i.e., between being interested in things
for  what  they  are  in  themselves  (intrinsic  value)  and  being  in
interested  in  things  for  their  utility  (practical  value).  In  the
twentieth century, however, the possibility of disinterested pleasure
was put  into question.  Some even went so far  as to consider it
nonsensical (Dickie 1969a: 31ff.). The notion of disinterestedness
is crucial to explain our interest in beauty as intrinsic value, but it
cannot explain other forms of engagement with art in which beauty
does not play a role (see also Carroll 2001: 39).
A similar move is manifest in materialist aesthetics, such as that
developed  by  Theodor  W.  Adorno  and  Bertolt  Brecht,  which
challenges the idea that the primary function of art is to please the
audience. Rather than making us indulge in pleasant feelings, art
should prompt moral reflection and move us to social action. What
makes art important for human practice is not its beauty, but its
social,  practical,  moral,  and  political  dimensions,  as  well  as  its
potential  to  change  human lives  and society.  Illustrative  of  this
view is Brecht’s idea that our engagement with art has to induce
detachment  and  alienation  by  employing  what  he  calls  the
“estrangement effect” (V-Effekt, Verfremdungseffekt) (Brecht 1953:
110). It is only estrangement – not pleasure, disinterestedness, or
contemplation  –  that  induces  ethical  reflection  and  action.
According  to  this  perspective,  the  function  of  art  consists  in
presenting ordinary objects and situations in a different  light,  to
make us reflect on them, and to invite us to act in favor of social
change.1 (A similar view can be found in Adorno 1970: 409). In
consequence, rather than having an intrinsic value of its own, art is
valuable  only  from the  point  of  view of  practical  interest.  The
critiques  of  the  notions  of  pleasure,  contemplation,  and
disinterestedness raised by materialist aesthetics entail a critique of
1 Though Brecht is criticizing the theory of identification with characters
in theater, he extends his claim to other arts (Brecht 1953: 139).
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beauty as value of art, since beauty is typically taken to be related
to all these concepts. 
A second reason for the decrease in interest in beauty might be
owed to the fact that in the attempt to overcome the reduction of
the aesthetic to beauty, new definitions of art have been formulated
from the middle of the last century on. These developments have
made way for new approaches – in what follows we will focus on
two of the most prominent examples, the institutional theory and
the theory of art  as an open concept – that  have broadened the
horizons of aesthetics and focused on aspects that had been largely
overlooked until then. 
The  institutional  theory  of  art,  such  as  the  one proposed by
Dickie (1969b), calls for us to broaden the narrow focus on works
of art and the artist, respectively, and to also take into account the
historical,  social,  and  cultural  dimensions  of  art  as  a  human
practice. According to this theory, an object achieves its status as
an artwork not primarily on the basis of the artists’ intentions or
some  of  its  intrinsic  properties  (like,  for  example,  its  being
“beautiful”),  but first  and foremost  in virtue of a community of
people,  the  “artworld”,  who  consider  it  as  such.  Consequently,
beauty is no longer regarded an essential feature of art; whether or
not  an  object  is  an  artwork  rather  depends  on  the  institutional
context from which it emerges and in which it is embedded. 
Morris  Weitz’s  anti-essentialist  position,  on  the  other  hand,
holds that the concept of art cannot be characterized by a set of
definitive criteria and suggests that it should be better regarded as
an  “open  concept”  (Weitz  1977:  23).  Inspired  by  Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s  notion  of  family  resemblance  concepts
(Wittgenstein 1953, §§65–78), the open concept approach suggests
that the concept “art” cannot be defined on the basis of a common
set of properties (Weitz 1956) that could stand as necessary and
jointly sufficient conditions and, thus, determine whether or not an
object  is  to be considered an artwork.  Rather, there are features
that artworks can but need not necessarily manifest. According to
this  form of  anti-essentialism,  thus,  beauty  is  but  one  of  many
factors  we  might  expect  to  find  in  artworks,  but  it  is  not  a
distinguishing criterion. 
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Third,  the  critique  of  classical  notions  of  aesthetics  that
attributed a central  role to beauty and the attempts to introduce
new definitions of art have invited aestheticians to focus on values
and  functions  of  art  other  than  beauty.  In  both  art  theory  and
practice, the political and moral potential of art to change society
and to improve human lives gained more and more attention. This
focus on the social and practical functions is linked to the rejection
of the idea of “l’art pour l’art”, which implies an elitist model of
art, and to the rejection of ornamental conceptions of art according
to which the main function of art is to evoke pleasant experiences
on the part of the spectator. 
This point is illustrated very well by a debate that goes beyond
the political  or  moral  function of art:  the debate concerning the
cognitive value of art, which has become one of the main concerns
of  philosophical  aesthetics  since the  middle  of  the last  century.
Some  philosophers,  who  advocate  a  non-cognitivist  position,
suggest that art cannot and should not teach us relevant knowledge
about the real world. Moreover, it has been argued that insisting on
the cognitive value of art would entail  instrumentalizing art and
undermining its aesthetic dimension. The majority of philosophers
who worked in aesthetics in the late twentieth century, however,
have insisted that  engaging with works of art  can and typically
does  broaden  our  cognitive  horizons.  Different  versions  of
cognitivism have been developed. Some philosophers have argued
that  the  cognitive  gain  can  be  explained  on  the  basis  of  a
transmission  of  truths,  of  warranted  beliefs,  or  of  propositional
knowledge. Others have suggested that artworks can (only) present
hypotheses  for  contemplation  and  themes  for  discussion.  Still
others  regard  works  of  art  as  expressions  of  a  subjective
perspective  on our  shared reality  that  can enrich  the  recipient’s
point of view or as the re-presentation of experiences relevant for
the human being. In sum, the cognitive value of art in general and
of different forms of art in particular was one of the main issues in
philosophical  aesthetics  of  the  last  century  from Beardsley  and
Hospers  (Beardsley 1981;  Hospers  1946)  and to  this  day.2 This
resulted in  a  shift  of  attention,  though:  the strong focus  on the
2 For a definition of aesthetic cognitivism and an overview of the debate,
see Gaut 2006.
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cognitive  dimension  of  art  has  risked  eclipsing  the  aesthetic
dimension of art and, as a result, has pushed the notion of beauty
into the background. 
Finally, the decline of beauty has also been brought about by a
change in the very conception of art and of artistic practice. As art
has increasingly been understood as an expression of creativity and
originality, its capacities to be innovative and break with tradition
have assumed greater  importance.  Moreover,  the early twentieth
century witnessed the rise of artistic practices that contributed to
enforce  this  tendency.  Expressionism,  Dadaism,  surrealist  art,
conceptual  art,  and  performance  art,  to  mention  but  a  few,
questioned the idea of a golden rule. Harmony was abandoned in
favor of deviation, often with the goal of presenting the world from
a new perspective and overcoming received patterns of perceiving,
thinking, and emoting. With this development, the value of beauty
lost its importance. 
Motives for a re-evaluation
The  four  points  mentioned  can  explain,  at  least  in  part,  the
development  and  transformations  that  the  notion  of  beauty  has
undergone in the twentieth century. In the most recent debate in
aesthetics, however, there are some contributions that contrast with
this tendency.3 The growing interest in the notion of beauty, which
is reflected in an increasing number of publications on the topic,
must not be taken as an attempt to fall back into the old trap of
reducing  art  to  beauty,  or  art  theory  to  a  theory  of  beauty,
respectively.  Rather,  what  we  find  is  an  attempt  to  enrich  the
current debate in aesthetics by exploring one of the concepts that
historically  has  been  considered  crucial  to  it.  Against  this
background,  we  think  that  one  of  the  most  urgent  tasks  for
contemporary aesthetics is to explore the concept of beauty in all
its dimensions.
Moreover, a re-evaluation of the notion of beauty allows us to
take  into  consideration  aspects  that  have  become  increasingly
important  in  recent  philosophical  scholarship.  To  begin  with,  a
more  profound  understanding  of  beauty  might  enhance  our
3 For this diagnosis, see De Clercq 2013: 299; Startwell 2017.
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understanding of the architecture and functioning of our mind, as
the experience of beauty is linked to abilities such as perceiving,
imagining, judging, feeling, and acting. The claim that a landscape,
a painting, a novel, or a poem are beautiful presupposes our ability
to sensuously perceive these objects, to appreciate some of their
properties  (color,  shape,  rhyme,  etc.),  to  evaluate  them  from  a
certain perspective, to grasp what they represent, to feel the values
they embody, to react emotionally to them4 and perhaps to even be
motivated  by  them  to  act  in  a  certain  way.  Moreover,  the
experience  of  beauty  is  related  to  sensations  of  pleasure  and
comfort, to feelings of vitality and a sense of well-being.5 All these
aspects play a consistent role in the mental life of human beings,
which suggests that a better understanding of beauty can contribute
to our understanding of these aspects and their relation to other key
facets of our psychology. 
In addition, a focus on beauty should not come at the expense
of  other  values  of  art;  on  the  contrary,  such  focus  might
comprehend our understanding of how very different values of an
artwork can be related to one another. The realization of beauty
can,  for  example,  be  crucial  for  the  social,  political,  practical,
moral, or epistemic value of an artwork to unfold in an effective
way. Thus,  the capacity of an artwork to touch and move us is
relevant not just from an aesthetic point of view, but also from an
epistemic  and  moral  perspective.  An  artwork  that  succeeds  in
focusing the spectators’ aesthetic experience invites them to take
its  “message”  or  “moral”  into  consideration;  in  this  way,  an
artwork might enrich the onlooker’s grasp of the world or prompt
them to reconsider  habitual  forms  of  behavior.  In  short,  beauty
might not simply be an end in itself, but might also constitute a
central factor that determines whether an artwork can successfully
perform other functions and achieve other goals. 
A further  reason  for  why  the  study  of  beauty  is  important
derives  from  its  anthropological  relevance.  By  reflecting  on
beauty, we achieve a better understanding of who we are, what we
value,  and what care about.  Despite all  efforts  to shift  attention
4 For instance, with rapture, joy, hope or even with love, as Alexander
Nehamas has claimed (Nehamas 2007).
5 For an analysis of pleasure and judgment, see De Clercq 2013: 303.
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away from beauty and to focus on other aspects of art, beauty has
not lost all of its significance in our everyday lives. We live in a
world concerned with beauty and beautiful things. We enjoy – and
actively seek out – the beauty of material objects, of artworks, of
nature,  of  other  persons  and  their  characters,  and  of  ideas  and
feelings.  It  seems  safe  to  say  that  the  search  for  beauty  is  an
anthropological constant of our human condition. Roger Scruton
has drawn attention to this point when arguing that our need for
beauty was essential in order to be fulfilled as human beings. Thus,
the experience of beauty tells us that “we are at home in the world,
that the world is already ordered in our perceptions as a place fit
for the lives of beings like us” (Scruton 2011: 145).
The perspective we have presented allows us to appreciate that
the loss of interest in beauty in the last century was a reaction to a
reductionist understanding of art and aesthetics that has opened up
the debate  and called for  greater  attention  to  be  given  to  other
aspects and values of art, many of which had been overlooked. Yet,
it also demonstrates that in contemporary aesthetics and art theory,
a  re-evaluation  of  the  notion  of  beauty  in  all  its  dimensions  is
needed  if  we  want  to  strive  for  a  more  comprehensive
understanding and do justice to a dimension of art that has always
been, and indeed continues to be, of central importance.
The main issues
The papers  contained in the present  volume address a series  of
questions  that  can  be  summarized  under  the  following  three
headings: What is beauty? What is beautiful? How does the value
of beauty relate to aesthetic values? In what follows we want to
give a short characterization of these questions – not in order to
provide answers  or  to  elaborate  definite  solutions,  but  rather  to
illustrate the complexity of the topic and to present the agenda for
the  study  of  beauty  in  contemporary  research,  as  well  as  to
delineate  the  logical  space  in  which  the  articles  of  the  present
volume are situated.
The  first  of  these  questions,  “What  is  beauty?”, directs  our
attention towards the very nature of beauty. The complexity of this
issue  is  related  to  the  fact  that  the concept  of  beauty  has  been
employed  with  very  different  meanings  in  different  historical,
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social, and cultural settings.6 Moreover, also within contemporary
aesthetics, which emerges mainly out of the Western tradition, the
concept  of  beauty is  employed in an ambiguous and polysemic
way.7 In some uses, the term “beauty” is defined as an intrinsic
value  or  property  of  objects,  while  at  other  times  beauty  is
understood  in  its  relation  to  aesthetic  judgments  or  to  the
emotional  reaction  that  these  objects  typically  arouse  in  the
spectator. 
The  former  use,  which  goes  back  to  Plato  but  remains
prominent today (see, for example, Zangwill 2001: 12), is tied to
an understanding of beauty as an evaluative property or quality, i.e.
as  a  value.  More  specifically,  beauty  has  been  regarded  as  the
highest of all aesthetic values. However, within the frame of this
“value view of beauty”, there is no consensus as to whether beauty
is  a  single  property  or  the  result  of  a  combination  of  other
properties  such  as  harmony,  configuration,  attractiveness  or  the
like. 
While  this  conception  of  beauty  focuses  primarily  on  the
objects that instantiate the relevant aesthetic properties, there is a
different  understanding  of  beauty,  which  denies  that  beauty  is
independent of the human capacity to respond to it. These views
raise the questions of whether – and how – beauty is related to
aesthetic judgments and emotions. In this vein, beauty has been
accounted for in terms of feeling or emotion (Bell 1987 [1914]), as
related to longing and love (Nehamas 2007), and it has also been
explained in terms of a certain form of judgment (for a discussion
on this see Kant 1951 [1790]).8 
Furthermore,  several  philosophers  have  pointed  out  that  we
should not expect to find a simple and unified definition of beauty,
as  the  range  of  objects  to  which  one  can  ascribe  the  relevant
properties – or which justify the relevant judgments or arouse the
relevant  reactions  in  the  spectator  –  are  multifarious.  Since  we
6 For an overview of the concept in different languages,  see Startwell
2004.
7 A discussion of the ambiguity of the term “beauty” can be found in the
following  authors:  Carroll  2001:  24;  De  Clercq  2013:  299;  Levinson
2011: 191; Scruton 2011: 15f.
8 For an overview of theories of beauty, see Startwell 2017.
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employ the term “beauty” to characterize different objects, beauty
is  –  as  Levinson  puts  it  –  “no  one”  and  we  should  consider
different types of beauty concerning natural, artistic, and physical
beauty (Levinson 2011: 190). 
The  second  question,  “What  is  beautiful?”,  focuses  on  the
nature  of  objects  to  which  beauty  can  be  ascribed.  While  in
aesthetics  and art  theory,  we  commonly  ascribe  beauty  only  to
human artifacts,  in everyday discourse nature,  creatures,  person,
characters, ideas, and motions are also said to be beautiful. This
raises questions as to whether the same concept of beautiful – and,
in consequence, the same conception of beauty – is operative in all
these uses. In what sense is the beauty of a landscape the same
beauty as that of an artwork or of a person? Though we employ the
same concept to describe these objects, it seems that the respective
uses differ substantially depending on whether we employ it, say,
for a human artifact or for a human being.
These issues invite a possible taxonomy of beauty according to
the objects  to which the property is  attributed.  In  this  vein,  we
could distinguish between sensual and intellectual beauty, between
objective and subjective beauty, or between inner and outer beauty.
Moreover,  this  aspect  of  beauty  also  invites  us  to  consider
aspects concerning human efforts to embellish oneself and one’s
direct environment. In this perspective we can come to take into
account issues that have long been overlooked in aesthetics, such
as the function of cosmetics and makeup and the politics and social
motives behind it.
The third question concerns “the relation between beauty and
other aesthetic values”. Beauty has long been considered to be the
highest value of the aesthetic domain – to the point that the term
“beautiful” has been used as a shortcut for “of aesthetic value”. If
one tries to approach questions of aesthetics,  art  theory,  and art
practice in a more differentiated way, however, it can be useful to
regard beauty as  a  different  phenomenon,  one that  is  related to
aesthetic  value  but  which  cannot  be  assimilated  to  it.  In  this
perspective,  it  becomes  necessary  to  shed  light  on  these  issues
concerning the relation between beauty and aesthetic value (for a
more detailed discussion on this topic, see Lopes 2018: 235). 
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Moreover, if beauty is an aesthetic value, we have to clarify its
place within the domain of the aesthetic (as a central, peripheral, or
merely one value among others).  We also need to shed light on
how beauty relates to other aesthetic values, though, such as the
sublime, the ugly, the shocking, the disgusting, etc. If, on the other
hand, beauty is not an aesthetic value, then we need to understand
how it relates to aesthetic value in general. 
Finally, it is necessary to understand how beauty relates to non-
aesthetic  values.  In  particular,  we  need  to  explore  the  relation
between beauty and epistemic values such as truth, knowledge, or
understanding  on  the  one  side,  and  beauty  and  the  domain  of
ethical values on the other.9 
The contributions to this volume
In the contributions to the present volume, leading scholars in the
field develop their own perspectives on the issues raised above.
The  collection  opens  with  Sonia  Sedivy’s  paper  “Beauty  and
Aesthetic Properties: Taking Inspiration from Kant”, in which she
focuses  on  the  relationship  between  beauty  and  aesthetic
properties. By distinguishing between the notion of beauty and the
notion of aesthetic value, Sedivy explores the notion of aesthetic
properties elaborating on Kant’s insights about beauty according to
which  aesthetic  properties  are  analogous  to  beauty,  but  beauty
remains a distinct notion. 
In “Beauty and Rules: Kant and Wittgenstein on the Cognitive
Relevance  of  Aesthetics”,  Hanne  Appelqvist  argues  for  the
significance  of  rules  in  aesthetics.  Drawing  on  Kant  and
Wittgenstein, she focuses on beauty-judgments. Both philosophers
acknowledge a subjective response as indispensable condition for a
judgment of beauty, connect the concept of beauty with the notion
of a rule, and understand the judgment of beauty as an example of
a rule that provides a model of the kind of judgment that may be
treated as normative in spite of lacking a conceptual justification.
The availability of subjectively based yet normative judgments of
this kind is essential for making sense of cognition in general.
9 For an overview of debates on both aspects, see Gaut 2006 and 2013.
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Elisabeth  Schellekens’  paper  “Challenging  the  Notion  of
Intelligible  Beauty”  examines  three  challenges  to  the  idea  that
there can be such a thing as non-sensible or intelligible beauty: the
perceptual challenge, the conflation challenge, and the reductivism
challenge.  According  to  Schellekens,  these  challenges  are
important because they unveil aspects of intelligibility ascribed to
some  instances  of  beauty  that  require  further  elucidation.  She
considers  a  notion  of  intelligible  beauty  and  discusses  how  it
relates to perceptual sense-experience and to aesthetic value. 
In  the  paper  entitled  “Non-Sensory  Beauty  and  Meaning
Qualia”, Maria Elisabeth Reicher defends the view that beauty and
aesthetic  properties  in  general  are  dispositional  properties  that
supervene  upon  lower-level  properties.  The  paper  defends  a
dispositional theory of beauty and argues that there are forms of
non-sensory  beauty.  Moreover,  Reicher  suggests  that  there  are
meaning qualia that are distinct from and not reducible to sensory
quality.  According  to  this  perspective,  meaning  qualia  are  the
supervenience  base  of  non-sensory  beauty  of  narrative  and
representative works of art. 
Maria José Alcaraz León argues, in her paper “Beauty and the
Agential  Dimension  of  the  Judgment  of  Taste”,  that  aesthetic
judgment  has  mostly  been  understood  in  parallel  to  perceptual
judgments, which has resulted in a focus on epistemic aspects. She
shows  this  understanding  of  the  aesthetic  to  be  incomplete,
especially when it comes to explaining phenomena related to the
exercise  of  aesthetic  judgment,  such  as  aesthetic  alienation,
inconsistencies of taste, or the distinctive character of bad taste.
The  paper  advocates  a  broader  understanding  of  aesthetic
judgment, which takes the agential aspects into consideration. 
The view that beauty can be understood as a kind of emotion is
examined by Catrin Misselhorn in her paper entitled “Beauty and
Bell’s  Aesthetic Emotion”. She claims that  this kind of emotion
differs  from  other  emotions  by  being  distinctively  aesthetic.
Misselhorn  draws  on  Clive  Bell’s  position,  according  to  which
there are specific aesthetic emotions, and refines it with insights
gleaned from contemporary theory of emotion, according to which
emotions involve consciousness and intentionality. 
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In the chapter “An Aesthetics of Insight”, John Gibson takes as
his point of departure Danto’s idea that through a special act of
identification “an artwork becomes a metaphor for life, and life is
transfigured”. Gibson’s aim is to examine how literary works of art
might function as primary vehicles of figurative identification and
of the kind of achievement that Danto calls “a transfiguration of
life”, which Gibson casts as an expansion of our possibilities for
ascribing sense to the world beyond the work of art. He explains
the  cognitive  value  of  art  not  in  terms  of  warranted  belief  and
propositional  knowledge,  but  as  a  distinctive  variety  of
metaphorical understanding.
In “Art, Beauty, and Criticism”, Noël Carroll examines the role
of beauty in art and criticism. After introducing Batteux’s idea that
art  has  to  be  understood  as  the  imitation  of  beauty  in  nature,
Carroll challenges the conception that beauty is the aim of art by
showing that there are many historical examples – and not only
from  the  last  150  years  –  that  eschew  beauty  in  order  to
communicate  a  variety of  ideas.  Drawing on Danto’s  work and
amending his theory, Carroll turns to examine the role of beauty in
Criticism. 
In his contribution “The Value of Art: On Meaning, Expression,
and  Aesthetic  Experience  in  Difficult  Modern  Art”,  Richard
Eldridge  discusses  the  significance  of  beauty  and  aesthetic
pleasure  in  contemporary  art.  Art,  he  suggests,  seems  to  have
turned  against  the  pursuit  of  beauty  and  criticism;  thought,
provocation,  and  meaning  seem  to  matter  more  than  aesthetic
pleasure. Discussing Danto’s theory of art as embodied meaning
and  considering  a  range  of  examples  from  the  avant-garde,
Eldridge shows that beauty and aesthetic pleasure are still central
values in the practices of creating and responding to art.
The role of beauty in conceptual art is discussed by Davide Dal
Sasso  in  his  chapter  “The  Beauty  of  Doing:  Remarks  on  the
Appreciation of Conceptual Art”. He suggests that the beauty of
conceptual art has to be considered as the beauty of what artists do.
In  order  to  develop  his  argument,  Dal  Sasso  introduces  and
discusses Denis Diderot’s relational concept of beauty and the idea
of concrete expression and applies both to the field of conceptual
art. 
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Otto Neumaier explores the place of beauty within aesthetics in
his  “The  Case  Against  Beauty”.  Though he  does  not  deny that
beauty is a central category of aesthetics, he argues against the idea
that  beauty is the subject  matter  of aesthetics,  i.e.,  the idea that
beauty  is  what  defines  aesthetics.  In  his  view,  this  idea  would
undermine  the  foundation  of  aesthetics  as  a  philosophical
discipline. 
In “Aesthetic Experience and the Experience of Poetry”, Peter
Lamarque analyzes the nature and function of aesthetic experience
as a response to poetry. The place of beauty in the appraisal  of
poems is explored by analyzing different connotations of the idea
of a beautiful poem. A kind of beauty is associated with perceptual
formal qualities (assonance, rhyme, meter,  etc.);  another kind of
beauty  can  be  found  in  the  subject  of  the  poem  (including  its
imagery, its emotional resonance); finally, there is a further kind of
poetic appreciation which is centered in the consonance of means
to ends, of how the poem works. 
Allen Carlson examines questions concerning “The Beauty of
Landscape”.  Drawing  on  some  insights  put  forward  by  George
Santayana in  The Sense of Beauty, he approaches the beauty of a
landscape  as  a  question  related  to  its  composition.  Carlson
considers traditional and modern theories of aesthetic appreciation
of  natural  and  cultural  environments  and  how  these  accounts
provide  different  perspectives  on landscape composition  and on
the nature of the beauty of landscapes. 
Lisa Schmalzried’s paper “The Virtue Analysis of Inner Beauty:
Inner Beauty as Moral, Eudaimonistic, or Relational Virtueness” is
devoted  to  inner  beauty.  After  formulating  two  criteria  for
assessing and comparing analyses of inner beauty, she introduces
the  idea  of  virtue-analysis.  She  goes  on  to  discusses  the  moral
virtue-analysis according to which inner beauty only depends on
morally desirable character traits, the eudaimonistic virtue-analysis
which explains inner beauty in terms of Aristotelian virtuousness
and, finally, the relational virtue-analysis according to which inner
beauty is explained as relational virtuousness.
In  his  chapter  “Cosmetics  and  Make  Up”,  Stephen  Davies
explores  the  history  and  the  beautifying  function  of  cosmetics.
This  exploration  takes  into  consideration  the  sexual  politics
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implied and expressed in such practices. The paper focuses mainly
on  the  different  ways  that  have  existed  since  ancient  times  of
decorating the face and the head. It examines how in the world of
cosmetics and make up, self-adornment and physical beauty come
together. 
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